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How Can We Think of Hegel as 
Emancipatory? 
 
Cindy Zeiher & Mike Grimshaw 
 
Hegel never made any claim that he wanted to change the world. Hegelians since 
Hegel have been a different matter. This history is what makes the emancipatory 
project ascribed to Hegel by contemporary Hegelians such an interesting trajectory 
in continental theory and thought. For Hegel arguably did change something; a 
procedure for thinking and, perhaps even, action. A combination of thinking and 
thinking-in-action has seen Hegel resurrected in recent years and taken up by many 
who purport that Hegel silently, implicitly makes nudges towards emancipation and 
who is more than just the other-side to Kant.  
 
Might such a reading of Hegel make Hegel less Hegelian? Or in our efforts to 
traverse Hegel, might an emancipatory reading offer another way into Hegel? One of 
the most admired sections in Phenomenology is his writing on the master and the 
slave as a way of establishing and entering into self-consciousness. Hegel asks an 
important question: what is it that I need from the other in order to receive recognition? 
Moreover, what is it by the existence of another which threatens this recognition that I 
crave? Hegel purports that such recognition is not one of mutual exchange but 
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combative, conflictual and unequal; a recognition which is purported on 
interdependence. How is it then that the slave can become free, one might ask? 
Hegel’s suggestion is that it is not necessarily via the release from the Master, but 
rather when the slave retreats into her consciousness; a retreat which cannot be 
divorced from its historical condition. Thus, a slave is truly free when the slave remains 
in all consciousness, a slave. That is, being a slave is not the essential reality because 
of the chains which harness freedom, but rather, a slave is free simply because the 
chains no longer matter as one can find consolation in the mind. There is a 
contradiction at the core of such freedom, one which completely rejects external 
reality and instead attends to the propensity and detachment of thought rather than to 
recognition. This is where McGowan’s thesis on Hegel’s emancipation begins. The 
question McGowan raises is, as stated via the title of his book, of Emancipation after 
Hegel; that is, not only can emancipation be rethought after Hegel but even more 
pressing, should it? 
 
The contributors to this special issue on Reading Todd McGowan’s 
‘Emancipation after Hegel’ respond in various ways and take up positions regarding 
not only Hegel and his thinking, but whether it has emancipatory potential, as 
McGowan purports it does.  
 
We thank the contributors to this issue, all of whom were invited by the editors 
and as interlocutors to the possibility of an emancipatory Hegel.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
